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Introduction: 
 
“The only way to patch a vulnerability is to expose it first… the flip side being that 
exposing the vulnerability leaves you open for an exploit”  
 
Elliot Alderson, Mr Robot, s2 ep 4, 14m25s 
 
Cybersecurity is a convoluted domain to navigate, filled with acronyms, esoteric 
terminology, and an ever-shifting roster of actors and threats. We can begin by thinking 
about the contested term ‘hacker’ to get a sense of the diversity1. Hackers could be 
framed as sitting somewhere on the spectrum between law abiding ‘white hats’ and 
criminal ‘black hats’, but that would neglect the richness of the various tribes who mix 
and overlap. To take a few, we have 
 
1. traditional cyber criminals organising campaigns to infect laptops or 
smartphones with remote access tools which allow them to record victims in 
precarious acts via their webcams with a view to extorting them to prevent 
release of the footage,2  
2. Organised crime groups running peer-to-peer marketplaces on the ‘dark net’ 
enabling trade of drugs, people, or extreme pornography,3  
                                            
1 To see the history of the term hacker, and associated terms, see S Levy, Hackers: Heroes of the 
Computer Revolution 25th Anniversary Ed. (Newton: O’Reilly Media, 2010) 
2 R.S. Portnoff et al., “Somebody’s Watching Me?: Assessing the Effectiveness of Webcam Indicator 
Lights” (2015) 1 Proceedings of the ACM CHI’15 Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems 
1649–1658. 
3 J. Bartlett, The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld (London: Heinemann, 2015). 
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3. Loose hacker collectives, like Lulzsec or Anonymous, which use hacking for 
social justice purposes, retaliating against organisations for their perceived 
immoral acts,4  
4. State sponsored hackers attacking foreign infrastructure in so-called advanced 
persistent threats or patriotic campaigns to spread propaganda, steal military 
secrets, or interfere with foreign elections,5 and  
5. Solitary characters hacking from their bedrooms into US military or national 
security infrastructure, seeking to prove existence of UFOs, and subsequently 
spending years fighting extradition.6  
 
Popular culture plays with many of these stereotypes, from the recent and critically 
acclaimed TV series Mr Robot, back to the 1980s and 1990s cult classic movies War 
Games and Hackers. Unpacking the diversity of hacker communities (an interesting 
anthropological and criminological topic of inquiry)7 helps us to get a sense of the 
multitude of actors, trends, motivations, threats, and practices that cybersecurity 
regulation must contend with.  
 
The types of crime being committed online vary from traditional crimes enabled by IT 
infrastructure, for example tax evasion, to true cybercrimes that would not exist but for 
the internet, for example bitcoin fraud. There are also hybrid crimes which sit 
somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.8 Criminal laws in jurisdictions across the 
globe largely follow the distinctions developed by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime: 
 
1. acts against confidentiality, integrity and availability of data or systems, for 
example illegal access to a computer, interception, or acquisition of data;  
                                            
4 P. Olson, We Are Anonymous : Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber 
Insurgency (Back Bay Books 2013). 
5 D. Alperovitch, “Revealed: Operation Shady RAT”, White Paper, 2011. 
6 "Gary McKinnon Resource Page" (The Guardian, 2017), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/gary-mckinnon (accessed 30 April 2018). 
7 R. Jones, “Cybercrime and Internet Security: A Criminological Introduction”, in Law and the Internet,  
L. Edwards and C. Waelde (eds.) (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009), p. 1566; M. Yar, Cybercrime and 
Society (SAGE, 2013). 
8 D. Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age (Polity, 2007); Ross 
Anderson et al., “Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime: A Workshop”, Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security (WEIS), 2012, pp. 1–31. 
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2. acts for personal or financial gain or harm, for example computer fraud, identity 
theft, spam, or child grooming 
3. computer content related acts, for example hate speech, distribution of extreme 
or illegal pornography, or cyber terrorism.9  
 
Effective regulation in this setting is complicated by the convergence of IT and the 
blurring between physical and online lives caused by mobile and embedded 
computing. IT is increasingly going beyond the desktop, where wearable health 
devices and smart home appliances are becoming increasingly common.10 This 
occurs at the macro level too, with computation and sensing being embedded in the 
urban built environment to manage transport or energy infrastructure.11  
 
Legitimate and illegitimate economies associated with cybersecurity encapsulate both 
security vendors, consultants, and IT firms trying to patch or address threats, as well 
as organised crime groups trying to find the vulnerabilities and exploit them, for 
example by stockpiling and trading ‘zero day’ attacks.12 In addressing these 
challenges, law enforcement agencies need to contend with skillset or resource 
deficits and procedural challenges of cooperating across borders to address 
heterogeneous, transnational cybercrimes. As we explore in this chapter, regulating 
cybersecurity risks requires ways of cutting through the surrounding fear, uncertainty, 
and doubt to find strategies that enable measured and balanced responses. However, 
the fast pace of technological change is as ever in stark contrast with the patchwork 
of regulatory and policy frameworks that attempt to react to these novel phenomena.  
 
In this chapter we explore some of the complexities around regulating cybersecurity 
in the UK, Europe, and internationally. We analyse both legal and technical literature 
                                            
9 These draw similarities to the classes of crimes in the Convention on Cybercrime (discussed below); 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime (New York, 2013) (hereinafter 
‘UNODC Report’), p. 16. 
10 M. Weiser, “Some Computer Science Issues in Ubiquitous Computing” (1993) 7 Communications of 
the ACM 75–84; E. Aarts and S. Marzano, The New Everyday: Views on Ambient Intelligence (010 
Publishers: Rotterdam, 2003). 
11 L. Edwards, “Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities” (2016) 1(2) European Data 
Protection Law Review 28–58. 
12 L. Bilge and T. Dumitras, ‘Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day Attacks in the Real 
World’, Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security -- 
CCS’12, 2012, 833–44. 
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to provide a balanced picture of both the threats and responses, with attention given 
to novel contemporary challenges of regulating cyberwarfare and building a secure 
Internet of Things. Cybersecurity risks from emerging technologies cannot be solved 
with a purely legal approach; instead cooperation and participation between many 
stakeholders is necessary. Technologists, regulators, industry, and the public all have 
a role to play.  
 
1. Navigating the diversity of cybersecurity threats 
 
Getting a sense of the landscape of cyber threats means turning to a range of 
stakeholders.13 Commercial security vendors like Symantec,14 law enforcement 
agencies like the UK National Crime Agency (NCA),15 UK Government16 and 
international bodies like the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA)17 or the UN Office on Drugs and Crime can all assist in the navigation of this 
complex domain.18  
 
1.1 Threats and actors  
 
Currently, the traditional cybercrime infrastructure of botnets and exploit kits continues 
to be put to work spreading malware like Trojans, viruses, worms, key loggers, and 
remote access tools (RATs).19 Malware remains the dominant contemporary 
cybersecurity threat,20 driven overwhelmingly by financial motivations which are 
facilitated by the use of ransomware and extortion campaigns.21 2017’s WannaCry is 
                                            
13 Reflecting the fast pace of change in this area, most organisations release a threat landscape report 
each year.  
14Symantec Corporation, Internet Security Threat Report 2018 (March 2018) hereinafter ‘Symantec 
Report’ 
15 NCA / NCSC, The Cyber Threat to UK Business (2018), available at  
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberthreat herinafter ‘NCA Report ‘18’;  
16HM Government, Cyber Security Breaches Survey ’18 (2018) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70
2074/Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2018_-_Main_Report.pdf hereinafter ‘UK Breach Survey’ 
(accessed 30 April 2018) 
17 ENISA, Threat Landscape Report 2017 (Heraklion: 2018) (Herinafter ‘ENISA Report’). 
18 UNOCD Report, supra n. 9.  
19 ENISA Report, supra n. 17, p. 21. 
20 It is the top threat in ENISA Report, ibid.; UK Breach Survey supra n. 16. p36 for breakdown of 
breaches and attacks suffered by businesses and charities. 
21 NCA Report ‘18, supra n. 15. p. 7.  
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a prominent example of a major ransomware attack.22 Exploiting vulnerabilities in 
legacy Windows XP systems, it removed user access by encrypting files and 
demanding payment to regain access. It spread far and wide, with the UK National 
Health Service, Spanish telecoms giant Telefonica and US logistics firm all being 
affected.23  In general, such campaigns often target both individuals and organisations, 
whilst utilising other technological trends like anonymous cryptocurrencies and online 
social media to support both payment of ransoms and the sourcing of sensitive 
information that can be used to target individuals.24 NCA argues social engineering 
attacks on employees through professional social media sites on employer machines 
can be as big a risk as opening phishing mails.25  
 
Mobile malware is on the increase in 2018, according to Symantec26, and in general, 
malware has become more targeted. Financial sector focused trojans, for example, 
were used in a Bangladesh Bank heist where $81m was stolen through fraudulent 
transactions.27 This fits with wider trends towards monetising crime in more efficient 
ways. The notion of ‘cybercrime as a service’ has grown, with criminals offering to hire 
both their services and toolkits for users to leverage attacks.28 Relatively unskilled 
actors, like so-called script kiddies, have easy access to hacking tools.29 However, law 
enforcement agencies are responding, and the UK NCA’s Operation Vulcanalia 
targeted and arrested users of a DDoS-for-hire tool.30  
 
The cybersecurity threat actors vary and mix, from script kiddies to nation states. 
ENISA argue that the most active threat group are cybercriminals, especially in relation 
to extortion and blackmail. In the UK, cybercrime largely stems from organised crime 
groups in Russian-speaking Eastern European countries.31 Other particularly active 
groups include insider threats (who pose a significant challenge for organisations as 
                                            
22 ENISA Report, supra n. 17 p. 28 
23 NCA Report, supra n. 15 p.8  case study on WannaCry. 
24 ENISA Report, supra n. 17 p. 55. 
25NCSC/NCA, The Cyber Threat to UK Business (2017), hereinafter ‘NCA Report ‘17’, available at  
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/785-the-cyber-threat-to-uk-business/file 
(accessed 30 April 2018) 
26 Symantec Report, supra n. 14. 
27 NCA Report ’17 supra n. 25., p. 7. 
28 Ibid., p. 23 
29 Ibid., pp. 22–23. 
30 Ibid., p. 6. 
31 Ibid., sec. 3.3. 
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they involve legitimate employees abusing IT access privileges for financial gain, 
espionage, sabotage, or IP theft) and those driven by ideological goals like hacktivists, 
cyber spies, cyber fighters, and cyber terrorists. 32  
 
Finding vulnerabilities and patching them before threat agents exploit them is a 
complex process. Many stakeholders, from state security services to cybercriminals 
or IT security vendors have an interest in finding so called ‘zero day’ vulnerabilities 
(unpatched software security flaws), although of course their motives differ. 
Cybercriminals may find them and keep them hidden in order to sell the information to 
the highest bidder, while security services stockpile them for use in cyberattacks or 
surveillance and security vendors may look to patch them to protect individual and 
organisational customers. 
 
The UK Cybersecurity Strategy argues that general vulnerabilities include the growing 
number of systems going online which is in turn creating more threat vectors. Poor 
cyber hygiene practices by the ordinary users, such as not using antivirus software, 
and the lack of security skills across society and the continued use of unpatched 
legacy IT systems are a big concern.33 The NCA echo the latter point, and are 
concerned that despite widespread publicity of many vulnerabilities, like Heartbleed, 
these have not been fully patched.34 This enables nation states to take advantage of 
these older vulnerabilities, utilising less sophisticated approaches to leverage hacks 
in order to steal intellectual property or state secrets, and leaving more sophisticated 
tools only for when truly necessary.35 
 
Exploring the extent of UK cybersecurity threats, the 2018 Crime Survey for England 
and Wales shows fraud and computer misuse crimes were the most common in the 
survey, with 1 in 10 adults being a victim in the previous 12 months.36 The UK Cyber 
Security Breaches Survey 2018 (CSBS)37 shows that 43% of the businesses surveyed  
                                            
32 ENISA Report, supra n. 17. 
33 HM Government, National Cyber Security Strategy (2016), pp. 22–23. 
34 NCA Report ‘17, supra n. 25, p. 9. 
35 Ibid., p. 7. 
36 Office for National Statistics, Crime in England and Wales: Year Ending September 2017 (London, 
2018), p. 6 
37 UK Breach Survey supra n. 16 – surveyed 1,519 UK businesses and 569 UK registered charities 
from 9 October 2017 to 14 December 2017  
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experienced cyber security breaches or attacks in the last 12 months, growing to 72% 
when limited to large firms.38  Overall, the mean cost for all businesses of all identified 
breaches or attacks in 12 months of the survey £1230, rising to £3,100 when there is 
loss of data or an asset. For larger firms it goes from £9,260 to £22,300 for the same 
circumstances.39 In general, though, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime argue that 
estimating the full scale and cost of cybercrime is complicated to measure, in part due 
to underreporting.40 In any case, measures to fight cybercrime are often inefficient and 
lead to high indirect costs, as argued by Anderson et al.: “the botnet behind a third of 
the spam sent in 2010 earned its owners around US$2.7m, while worldwide 
expenditures on spam prevention probably exceeded a billion dollars.”41  
 
1.2 Botnets and DDoS 
 
We now consider botnets, the workhorses of the cybersecurity threat economy, in 
more detail. IT devices around the world can be compromised by malware, turning 
them into infected ‘zombie’ units, enslaved to a command and control server which 
remotely controls their behaviour on demand. These distributed systems are put to 
work, often for hire, to conduct distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) and spam 
campaigns.42 The major UN Office on Drugs and Crime Comprehensive Study on 
Cybercrime estimated around one million botnet command and control server globally, 
with high volume clusters in Eastern Europe, Central America, and the Caribbean.43 
We will consider these two applications in more detail. 
 
In DDoS attacks, servers are targeted with high volumes of legitimate packet requests 
until the traffic consumes resources like bandwidth or memory and the targeted 
servers cannot respond anymore. Services hosted on these servers are knocked 
offline temporarily, but DDoS attacks are not permanent, and impacts are often 
resolved once servers are brought back online.44 Nevertheless, downtime can cause 
                                            
38 Ibid., p. 1. 
39 Ibid. p. 42 
40 UNODC Report, supra n. 9, p. 21. 
41 Anderson et al., ‘Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime: A Workshop’, p. 7. 
42 G. Hogben, Botnets: Detection, Measurement, Disinfection and Defence (Heraklion: ENISA 2013) 
43 UNODC Report, supra n.9,  p. 33. 
44 See legal dimensions in L. Edwards, “Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill 
Zombies” (2006) 24(1) Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 23-59.  
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significant economic, safety, or political costs. Higher-risk targets may include critical 
IT infrastructure like hospitals, banks, and air traffic control systems, or services 
delivering time-critical political or safety information, for example in relation to natural 
disasters or terrorist attacks.  DDoS attacks can be as a distraction technique to mask 
more targeted hacks too, such as social engineering attacks which take advantage of 
the chaos during server downtime.45  
 
Spam levels fell from all-time highs in the early 2000s sits at 55% of all email volume 
in 2016, and is on the rise again. 46 The average number of emails in 2017 per user 
rose from 63 to 67. 47 Spam is a primary mechanism for delivering malware and 
malicious URLs (i.e. those that execute code when clicked) to targets.48 Despite 
increasingly sophisticated spam filters, more intelligent spam campaigns can still 
evade these and are able to fool their targets upon delivery, now moving more heavily 
to social networks too.49 We now look at two contemporary cybersecurity challenges: 
IoT security and cyberwarfare.  
 
1.3 Security in IoT and cyberwarfare 
 
The Internet of Things involves networking physical devices with a range of sensors, 
from thermostats to security cameras. The goal is often to enable new value-added 
services for users. This could mean automating mundane activities, like heating 
management, or increasing home security by enabling remote monitoring of who 
enters or leaves via a mobile application. In the industrial setting, companies embed 
sensors into different stages of product or service supply chains to identify efficiencies. 
This can lead to a number of risks, particularly around vulnerabilities in cyber-physical 
systems leading to physical harm from actuation in the real world.50The diversity of 
IoT application domains introduce a vast range of stakeholders from traditional IT 
hardware and software firms to energy firms, car manufacturers, and city councils. 
From a security perspective, there are many challenges, including (i) the pervasive 
                                            
45 Symantec Report, supra n. 14. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid p.73 
48 Ibid. 
49 ENISA Report, supra n. 17. p. 46. 
50 L Urquhart and D McAuley, “Avoiding the Internet of Insecure Industrial Things”, (2018) Computer 
Law and Security Review. 
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heterogeneity in the technical nature of IoT devices with different networking protocols, 
interfaces, sensing, and processing capabilities, (ii) diverging contexts of use, from 
transport to security to energy, and (iii) the nascent nature of the industry, in which 
security practices are either non-existent or are yet to be harmonised. With domestic 
IoT ecosystems, for example, devices from different manufacturers layered with 
services from different organisations may all be interacting, each with varying levels 
of security safeguards.51 Indeed, poor security practices in IoT are prevalent, where 
devices may lack even basic security measures, for example passwords.  
Compromised security vulnerabilities of smart domestic technologies like cars, insulin 
pumps, and children’s toys have all been shown.52  
 
These IoT vulnerabilities pose new routes for exploits, but they have a long way to 
catch up web infrastructure weaknesses (for example browsers, plugins, servers, and 
mobile applications).53 Nevertheless, we already see IoT devices being compromised 
and used in hacks. The Shodan search engine has been used to find unsecured IP 
connected devices, for example baby cameras, whose live video feed can be observed 
openly from anywhere in the world.54 The scale is significant, and as the UK NCA 
argue, “the Shodan search engine reveals, for example, over 41,000 units of one 
insecure model of DVR are connected to the Internet as of January 2017”.55 These 
are being exploited, and recent DDoS attacks on a domain name service (DNS) 
company were mediated, in part, by the Mirai IoT botnet, made up of compromised IP 
connected security cameras and digital video recorders (DVRs).56 Since Mirai, other 
IoT botnets have emerged, such as Persirai which targets IP Cameras specifically57, 
                                            
51 D. Barnard-Wills, L. Marinos, and S. Portesi, Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide for Smart 
Home and Converged Media (Heraklion, 2014). 
52 A. Greenberg, “Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway – With Me in It” (Wired, 21 July 2015), 
available at https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway (accessed 30 April 
2018); J. Finkle, “J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pump Vulnerable to Hacking” (Reuters, 4 
October 2016), available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e-
idUKKCN12411L (accessed 30 April 2018); D. Goodin, “Creepy IoT Teddy Bear Leaks >2 Million 
Parents’ and Kids’ Voice Messages’” (Ars Technica, 28 February 2017), available at 
https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/02/creepy-iot-teddy-bear-leaks-2-million-parents-and-kids-
voice-messages (accessed 30 April 2018). 
53 ENISA Report, supra n. 17. 
54 J.M. Porup, “How to Search the Internet of Things for Photos of Sleeping Babies” (Ars Technica, 19 
January 2016), available at https://arstechnica.co.uk/security/2016/01/how-to-search-the-internet-of-
things-for-photos-of-sleeping-babies (accessed 30 April 2018). 
55 NCA Report ‘17, supra n. 25, p. 6. 
56 Ibid. 
57 J Leyden, “Another IoT Botnet Has Been Found Feasting on Vulnerable IP Cameras” (The 
Register, 10 May 2017) https:// 
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and the Reaper botnet, created by actively hacking software instead of just hunting for 
default passwords. 58As the recent Internet Society report frames it, IoT devices have 
both inward and outward security implications, where the former impacts users, and 
the latter sees IoT becoming infrastructure for further attacks.59 
 
Addressing these issues, we see efforts towards standardisation in the IoT market as 
one response, as well as initiatives like Hypercat and the development of new 
standards, bringing safety concerns into security too.60  However, there is a long, 
political process between competing companies, governments, professional bodies, 
and civil stakeholder groups, all of whom must work together to agree on optimal 
security standards that provide protection without stifling innovation.61 In seeking to 
establish responsibility within IoT supply chains, the recent UK Government Secure 
by Design report maps IoT security obligations onto a variety of stakeholders. So, 
device manufacturers need to ensure no use of default passwords and provide 
software integrity whilst IoT service providers should monitor usage data for unusual 
activity or build in outage resilience.62 Similarly, the ACM Statement on IoT Privacy 
and Security surfaces the need for full life cycle management against threats, for 
example as devices change maintenance ownership.63 As has been seen with the 
WannaCry ransomware attacks being based on exploits in legacy software, the scope 
for harm with IoT devices that are not effectively managed longitudinally could be 
huge. These could involve significant physical and information security harms in a 




                                            
www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/10/persirai_iot_botnet/  
58 A Greenberg “The Reaper IoT Botnet Has Already Infected a Million Networks”, (Wired, 20 October 
2017) available at https://www.wired.com/story/reaper-iot-botnet-infected-million-networks/ (accessed 
30 April 2018). 
59Internet Society, IoT Security for Policy Makers (Geneva: 2018)  
60 E Leverett, R Clayton and R Anderson ‘Standardisation and Certification of the 'Internet of Things’ 
(2017) Proceedings of WEIS. 
61 A. Bouverot, GSMA: The Impact of the Internet of Things, The Connected Home (2015); IoT-UK, 
Establishing the Norm: Introduction to IoT Standards (London, 2017). 
62 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Secure by Design Report (London: 2018) 
63 USACM/ACM, ACM Statement on Internet of Things Privacy and Security, (2017) available at 
https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-
policy/2017_joint_statement_iotprivacysecurity.pdf, (accessed 30 April 2018). 
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Cyberwar is a contested term, but64 most commentators often agree use of the “world’s 
first digital weapon”, Stuxnet, was an act of cyberwarfare. 65 The state sponsored 2010 
Stuxnet worm attack (allegedly from the US and Israel)66 on the Iranian Natanz nuclear 
enrichment plant targeted specific Siemens industrial control systems, using a 
combination of fake authentication certificates and zero day exploits67 to reach its 
target and deploy a complex payload designed to destroy uranium enrichment 
centrifuges. The payload slowed production at the plant, as centrifuges had to be 
replaced more quickly. Ultimately it aimed to delay production of purportedly nuclear 
weapons using enriched uranium as part of the Iranian nuclear program.68  
 
Legalities of cyberwarfare have been considered within international law, in respect of 
both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.69 The targeting of critical civilian infrastructure as 
the ‘battlefield’ for playing out international tensions complicates navigation of this 
domain, however. Difficulties attributing the source of cyber-attacks leads to blurring 
of the lines between cybercrime, terrorism, espionage, and warfare. For example, 
online activity during the conventional armed conflict of the 2008 South Ossetia War 
saw Georgian websites targeted by state sponsored hacker group Russian Business 
Network.70 Similarly, sustained DDoS attacks against government departments, 
political parties, universities, and financial services perpetrated by ‘patriotic Russian 
hackers’ protesting the removal of the Bronze Soldier War Memorial from Tallinn 
Square in 2007 prompted NATO’s sustained attention in this domain from a military 
                                            
64 L. Urquhart, “Cyberwar: hype or reality?” (Naked Security, 20 March 2012), available at 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/03/20/cyber-war-hype-or-reality (accessed 30 April 2018); L. 
Urquhart, “Do we need another word for cyber war?” (Naked Security, 21 August 2012), available at 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/21/do-we-need-another-word-for-cyber-war (accessed 30 
April 2018). 
65 K. Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon” (WIRED, November 
2014), available at https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet (accessed 30 April 
2018). 
66 E. Nakashima and J. Warrick, “Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say” (The 
Washington Post, 2 June 2012), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-
say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html?utm_term=.9ee2a60c2170 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
67 i.e. unpatched vulnerabilities in IT systems that can be exploited. A market exists in buying these 
exploits before they are patched by vendors. 
68 K. Zetter, “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History” (Wired, 
7 November 2011), available at https://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-
stuxnet (accessed 30 April 2018). 
69 H.H. Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
70 J. Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks” (The New York Times, 12 August 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html (accessed 30 April 2018). 
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perspective.71 The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn 
has created the Tallinn Manuals which interpret the application of public international 
law to cyber operations during armed conflict72 and, more recently, during 
peacetime.73  
 
To further complicate the picture, there is growth of cyber-espionage threats, as seen 
in so called Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). High profile campaigns like 
Operation Shady RAT or Operation Aurora involve targeting of state and large-scale 
industrial infrastructure to steal foreign intellectual property and intelligence, to 
promote the economic and strategic interests of the perpetrators.74 The actors 
involved in these campaigns again range from state sponsored hacking groups to 
nation states, making identification of sources difficult. The term is also increasingly 
being used as an umbrella term in relation to a range of Russian cyber activities. These 
range from alleged intervention in foreign elections using misinformation, fake news 
and ‘troll farms’;75 increased hacking of routers and connected devices76; and cyber-
attacks on critical infrastructure, such as NotPetya.77 
 
                                            
71 J. Richards, “Denial of Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for US National Security” 
(2009) 18(2) International Affairs Review; Establishment of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence. 
72 Split into 2 parts – Part I International Cybersecurity Law (i.e. primarily jus ad bellum) with state 
attribution (Rules 6-9); Use of Force (10-12); Self Defence (13-17); then Part II on Law of Cyber Armed 
Conflict (i.e. primarily jus in bello) with detailed rules on cyber weapons, legitimate targets, cyber 
espionage and the nature of attacks (Rules 25-66). 
73 CCD COE NATO, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Tallinn: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 2nd ed.); CCD COE NATO, Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
74 D. Alperovitch, “Revealed: Operation Shady RAT” (McAfee, 2011), available at 
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf (accessed 30 April 
2018); J. Finkle, “Hacker Group in China Linked to Big Cyber Attacks: Symantec” (Reuters, 17 
September 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyberattacks-china-
idUSBRE98G0M720130917 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
75 Minority Staff Report, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault On Democracy In Russia And Europe: Implications 
For U.S. National Security (Washington, 2018) at 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf . (accessed 30 April 2018). 
76 N Kobie Nobody is Safe From Russia’s Colossal Hacking Operation’ Wired 21 April 2018 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/russia-hacking-russian-hackers-routers-ncsc-uk-us-2018-syria 
(accessed 30 April 2018) 
77 NCSC ‘ Russian Military Almost Certainly Responsible for Destructive 2017 Cyber Attack’ NCSC 
News, 15 Feb 2018 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russian-military-almost-certainly-responsible-
destructive-2017-cyber-attack (accessed 30 April 2018); for background on the attack see I Thomson, 
‘Everything you need to know about the Petya, er, NotPetya nasty trashing PCs worldwide’, The 
Register, 28 June 2017 
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Whilst zero-day vulnerabilities are often exploited to carry out cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, or industrial control systems,78 
traditional phishing campaigns are also often used. A good example is the blackouts 
and power outages from attacks on Ukrainian electricity distribution companies 
Prykarpattya Oblenergo and Kyiv Oblenergo which affected over 220,000 customers 
and which utilised malware distributed through phishing emails and malicious 
Microsoft Word files.79  
2. Legal and technical responses 
 
As our outline above shows, a complex network of attackers and defenders are in a 
perpetual game of chess, anticipating the moves and responses of their adversaries. 
Against this backdrop, the law seeks to intervene and to provide order in this ever-
shifting game. We look at the UK, EU, and international legal frameworks. In the UK, 
we focus heavily on the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (hereinafter ‘CMA 1990’) and its 
case law. At a European Level, we look briefly at data breach notification provisions 
in the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation, and also briefly summarise the 
Network and Information Security Directive 2016. Lastly, we reflect on the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime, and the challenges of Cyberwarfare. 
 
2.1 UK law  
 
We look at the CMA 1990, including amendments from Police and Criminal Justice 
Act 2015, through case law. In policing cybercrime, UK police have powers under the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016, for example in hacking devices, and within the Fraud 
Act for online attacks that create large financial loss.80 However, in this chapter we 
focus on the CMA 1990, and look at case law to unpack the challenges therein.  
                                            
78 For a discussion of the disruption of SCADA control systems used in power stations, see V.M. Igure, 
S.A. Laughter, and R. D. Williams, “Security Issues in SCADA Networks” (2006) 7(25) Computers and 
Security 498–506; See Urquhart and McAuley supra n. 50.  on cyberattacks and industrial 
infrastructure. 
79 HM Government, ‘National Cyber Security Strategy’, p. 21. 
80 See J. Zoest, “Computer Misuse Offences” (2014) Westlaw UK Latest Update, p. 4; Crown 
Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance on Fraud Act 2006, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/fraud_act (accessed 30 April 2018). In the 2006 Act see s. 2 (“Fraud 
by false representation”), s. 6 (“Possession of articles for use in frauds”), and s. 7 (“Making or supplying 
articles for use in frauds”). 
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2.1.1 Section 1 CMA 1990: Unauthorised access to computer material 
 
A section 1 CMA 1990 offence occurs when a person causes a computer to: 
 
1. perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held 
in any computer,81 (or to enable any such access to be secured), 
2. where “the access he intends to secure [or to enable to be secured] is 
unauthorised,” and  
3. ‘he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that 
that is the case’.82  
 
There are a few elements to consider in section 1. The term computer, frustratingly, is 
not defined in the law, but in subsequent case law it has been held to mean a “device 
for storing, processing and retrieving information.”83  
 
The intent to commit an offence does not have to be directed at any particular: 
 
1. programme or data, for example Microsoft Word;  
2. a programme or data of any particular kind, for example a word processing 
program; or 
3. a program or data held in any particular computer, for example on Alice’s 
computer.84  
 
With the CMA 1990, interpretation is provided in section 17, with sections 17(2) and 
17(5) being particularly important for defining “securing access” and “unauthorised 
access”, respectively. Section 17(2) states: 
 
                                            
81 Section 17(6) includes “references to any program or data held in any removable storage medium 
which is for the time being in the computer; and a computer is to be regarded as containing any program 
or data held in any such medium.” 
82 CMA 1990, s. 1(1)(a)-(c) as Amended by Police and Justice Act 2006, s. 35.  
83 DPP v Jones [1997] 2 CR App R 155, per Lord Hoffman at 163. 
84 CMA 1990, s. 1(2)(a)-(c). 
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“A person secures access to any program or data held in a computer if by 
causing a computer to perform any function he: 
 
(a) alters or erases the program or data; 
(b) copies or moves it to any storage medium other than that in which it 
is held or to a different location in the storage medium in which it is 
held; 
(c) uses it; [i.e. if the function he causes the computer to perform (a) 
causes the program to be executed; or (b) is itself a function of the 
program]85 
(d) has it output from the computer in which it is held (whether by having 
it displayed or in any other manner);  
and references to access to a program or data (and to an intent to secure 
such access [ or to enable such access to be secured]86) shall be read 
accordingly.”87 
 
Section 17(5) defines unauthorised access as:  
 
“Access of any kind by any person to any program or data held in a computer is 
unauthorised if: 
 
(a) he is not himself entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program 
or data; and  
(b) he does not have consent to access by him of the kind in question to the 
program or data from any person who is so entitled”88 
 
The case of Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1991) [1993] Q.B. 94 clarified that 
section 1 CMA 1990 does not require the use of a different computer for unauthorised 
                                            
85 Section 17(3). 
86 Added by Police and Justice Act 2006, Sch. 14, para. 29. 
87 Section 17(4) clarifies s. 17(2)(d), stating “(a) a program is output if the instructions of which it consists 
are output; and (b) the form in which any such instructions or any other data is output (and in particular 
whether or not it represents a form in which, in the case of instructions, they are capable of being 
executed or, in the case of data, it is capable of being processed by a computer) is immaterial.” 
88 Amended by Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 162(2) (1995) section 10 relates to use 
of other law enforcement powers.  
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access, but instead can be from the same computer, for example by “using another 
person's identifier (ID) and /or password without proper authority in order to access 
data or a program; displaying data from a computer to a screen or printer; or even 
simply switching on a computer without proper authority.”89 Indeed, the best way to 
understand the section 1 offence is through case law, which we now consider some 
in more depth.  
 
An interesting example for clarifying unauthorised access is Cuthbert,90 where a 
system penetration tester donated £30 to a Tsunami appeal website run by the 
Disasters Emergency Committee. After donating, he became suspicious of the 
website because of the image banner and lack of confirmation message given. He 
tested the site91 to ensure it was not a phishing scam, which triggered an intrusion 
response system. Despite his lack of intention to cause harm, he was convicted of 
breaching section 1 CMA 1990 because “unauthorised access, however praiseworthy 
the motives, is an offence”.92 This raised concern among the pen tester community 
around consequences of their techniques.93 
 
In DPP v Bignall94 two married police officers with authorised access to the Police 
National Computer used the system to obtain information for private purposes. The 
Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) claimed this was ‘unauthorised access’, as 
their access was meant to be only for police purposes. The DPP argued action taken 
for other purposes was no longer authorised, and thus a breach of section 1 CMA 
1990. However, the court held this action was not ‘unauthorised’, as defined in 
sections 17(2) or 17(5), stating instead that the role of the CMA 1990 is to protect 
against unauthorised access to computer material (i.e. hacking),95 and not to protect 
                                            
89 Zoest, supra n. 66, p. 1. 
90 “Regrettable Conviction Under Computer Misuse Act” (Out-Law, 7 Oct 2005), available at   
http://www.out-law.com/page-6207 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
91 P. Sommer, “Computer Misuse Prosecutions” (Society of Computers and Law, 2005), available at 
http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed832 (accessed 30 April 2018). Sommer states that “using a directory 
traversal test - in effect he re-formed the URL he could see in the command bar of his Internet browser 
to see whether the security settings on the remote Web site would allow him access beyond the web 
root. His attempt was rejected, he felt relieved and thought no more of the matter.” 
92 Stated by District Judge Mr Quentin Purdy. 
93 Although, according to Sommer, some in the community disagreed as to the appropriateness of using 
directory traversal as a test.  
94 [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 1.   
95 Ibid., at 12, per Astil J. 
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integrity of information stored on the computer.96  Under Bignall, “a person does not 
commit an offence under the 1990 Act, s1 if he accesses a computer at an authorised 
level for an unauthorised purpose”.97  
 
A few years later this all changed in R v Bow Street Magistrates Court ex Parte Allison 
No 2,98 where the court took a different stance towards authorised access. Here the 
House of Lords found that the CMA 1990 is not restricted to hacking, and can cover 
activities of employees who access data they were not authorised to.99 Allison 
allegedly obtained customer account information from an American Express employee 
as part of a fraud scheme that cost the company $1m.100 The employee had the ability 
to access all customer accounts, but was only authorised to access accounts related 
to her work. The information used for the fraudulent activity was taken from accounts 
she was not authorised to access.101 The House of Lords therefore clarified the scope 
of section 1, stating that it “refers to the intent to secure unauthorised access to any 
programme or data. These plain words leave no room for any suggestion that the 
relevant person may say: ‘Yes, I know that I was not authorised to access that data 
but I was authorised to access other data of the same kind.’”102 Interestingly, Lord 
Hobhouse still held that Bignell was “probably right”, because the police officers had 
asked a computer operator, who was operating within the authority of his job, to obtain 
information for police officers in response to their requests, and as such he was not 
breaching section 1 CMA 1990.103 MacEwan suggests that this reasoning is not 
persuasive, because the computer operator was “blissfully unaware of the real reason 
                                            
96 This is the remit of data protection laws, specifically the Data Protection Act (1984) at that time – this 
would now be s. 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998.  
97 Halisbury’s Laws of England, Supplement to 11(1) (4th Ed Reissue), para. 604A. 
98 (AP) [2000] 2 AC 216. 
99 [1999] 3 W.L.R. 620. 
100 [2000] 2 AC 216 at 220: “…she accessed various other accounts and files which had not been 
assigned to her and which she had not been given authority to work on. Having accessed those 
accounts and files without authority, she gave confidential information obtained from those accounts 
and files to, among others, Mr. Allison. The information she gave to him and to others was then used 
to encode other credit cards and supply P.I.N. numbers which could then be fraudulently used to obtain 
large sums of money from automatic teller machines”. This case also involved deliberations on 
extradition of Allison, which are not discussed here. Due to the nature of the attacks, many of these 
hacking cases involve extradition aspects, for example R. (on the application of McKinnon) v DPP 
[2009] EWHC 2021 (Admin), Ahzaz v United States [2013] EWHC 216 (Admin), and Maxwell-King v 
United States [2006] EWHC 3033 (Admin). 
101 See K. Stein, “Unauthorised Access and the UK Computer Misuse Act 1990: House of Lords ‘leaves 
no room’ for ambiguity” (2000) 6(3) C.T.L.R. 63-66. 
102 [2000] 2 A.C. 216, at 224. 
103 Ibid., at 225. 
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behind the Bignells’ requests”.104 Instead, the operator was an “innocent agent” and 
“the fact that the computer operators lacked mens rea means that they should not 
have been viewed as participants in the alleged offences. In such circumstances, ‘the 
principal is the participant in the crime whose act is the most immediate cause of the 
innocent agent’s act’. The Bignells fitted this description.”105 
 
2.1.2 CMA 1990 section 1 – sentencing 
 
We now look at sentencing to see how the courts punish CMA 1990 offences, and due 
to lack of formal sentencing guidance in the Act, we again turn to case law. With 
indictment, conviction for a section 1 offence is up to two years, a fine or both, whilst 
on summary conviction, an offender in England and Wales can be imprisoned for 12 
months, fined up to statutory maximum, or both (in Scotland the limits are identical, 
except the imprisonment cannot exceed six months).106 R v Mangham107 outlined 
several factors to be considered as aggravating factors when sentencing occurs, 
namely: 
 
 Whether the offence is planned and persistent, 
 The nature of damage caused to the system and to the wider public interest –  
considering national security, individual privacy, public confidence and commercial 
confidentiality,  
 The damage caused, including cost of remediation, 
 Motive and benefit, including revenge,  
 Whether the hacker tried to sell the compromised information, 
 Whether the information been passed to others, 
 The value of the intellectual property impacted, and 
 The psychological profile of the offender.108  
 
                                            
104 N. MacEwan, “The Computer Misuse Act 1990: lessons from its past and predictions for its future” 
(2008) 12 Criminal Law Review 955-967, p. 958. 
105 Ibid., p. 958; internal quote from I. Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (Oxford: OUP 
2007) p. 166.  
106 Section 3(a)-(c) as amended by Police and Justice Act s. 35. 
107 [2012] EWCA Crim 973. 
108 Ibid., per Cranston J at 19.  
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R v Martin (Lewys Stephen)109 is an example of the stricter view the courts are taking 
with CMA 1990 offences. This case involved offences under sections 1, 2, 3, and 
3A,110 and Leveson LJ stated it highlighted a particularly high level of culpability due 
to the level of detail in planning the attacks and the nature of the targets – Martin 
perpetrated denial of service attacks against police forces and universities, as well as 
changing the internet banking passwords of his victims. Given the wider implications 
of these crimes for society, Leveson LJ held that the sentences for the offences 
needed to “involve a real element of deterrence…those who commit them must expect 
to be punished accordingly.”111  
 
This can be seen in the wake of sentencing for perpetrators of high profile hacks, as 
in the 2013 case of R v Cleary, Davis, Al-Bassam and Ackroyd112 from hacktivism 
collective Lulzsec, and in the Crosskey case. With the former, they were tried for 
offences under section 3 of the CMA 1990, arising from Lulzsec DDoS attacks on high 
profile targets like the US Central Intelligence Agency, British Serious Organised 
Crime Agency, and News International. They also modified websites of the UK 
National Health Service, Twentieth Century Fox, and Sony Pictures Entertainment. 
This actions resulted in fairly severe custodial sentences from 24 months to 36 
months, and five year Serious Crime Prevention Orders for computer/internet use for 
all the offenders involved. 
 
This can be contrasted to an extent with R v Crosskey (Gareth).113 Crosskey 
misrepresented his identity to deceive Facebook into providing him with a password 
which he then used to access the Facebook account of actress Selena Gomez for a 
period of three days. He offered to sell stories to the celebrity press based on what he 
learned from this access, and posted a video on YouTube about the hack. Crosskey 
pled guilty, and mitigating factors like his act being a result of “bravado”, his regret for 
his actions, his previous good character, and the activity taking place over a short time 
                                            
109 [2013] EWCA Crim 1420. 
110 See Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2014, Section B17 Offences involving Computers – B17.14; in 
addition to two years’ imprisonment, he also received a deprivation order from using various IT 
equipment under Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s. 143. 
111 R v Martin, supra n. 99, para. 39. 
112 Southwark Crown Court, May 2013, reported in Zoest, supra n. 66, p. 5. 
113 [2012] EWCA Crim 1645. 
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meant his sentences for section 1 and 3 offences were reduced from 18 months of 
imprisonment to 12 months’ detention in a young offender institution.114  
 
2.1.3 CMA 1990 section 2 – unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate 
commission of further offences 
 
Section 2 of the CMA 1990 covers “unauthorised access with intent to commit or 
facilitate commission of further offences” where, after already committing a section 1 
offence, the perpetrator intends to commit or facilitate the commission (by himself or 
a different person) of another offence.115 The further offence will be one which carries 
either a sentence fixed by law, or one that would carry a five year sentence (if the 
offender is over 21 and does not have previous convictions).116 This further offence 
does not need to be committed at the same time as the section 1 offence – it can be 
“on any future occasion”117 – and it does not actually have to be possible for the 
subsequent offence to be committed.118 Example section 2 offences include 
“accessing without authority another person's personal data (such as name and bank 
account number) from a computer with the intention of using those details to transfer 
money from an on-line bank account.”119 For a summary conviction the sentence is 12 
months’ imprisonment, a fine not exceeding statutory minimum, or both, in England 
and Wales (the maximum imprisonment in Scotland is six months). On indictment, the 
maximum imprisonment is 5 years, as well as a fine, or both.  
 
2.1.4 CMA 1990 section 3 – unauthorised acts with intent to impair computer 
 
Section 3 covers “unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, 
operation of computer, etc.” An offence under this section is committed if an unauthorised 
                                            
114 Zoest, supra n. 66, p. 6, and [2012] EWCA Crim 1645. 
115 CMA 1990, s. 2(1)(a) and (b). 
116 Ibid. part (b) also includes this: “(or, in England and Wales, might be so sentenced but for the 
restrictions imposed by section 33 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980)”. 
117 Ibid., s. 2(3). 
118 Ibid., s. 2(4). 
119 Zoest, supra n. 66, p. 1. 
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act in relation to a computer is committed, where the perpetrator knows it is 
unauthorised.120 By doing the act they intend to121 
 “impair the operation of any computer”,  
 “prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer”,  
 “impair operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data”, or  
 enable any of the above to be done.122  
 
The conditions of not requiring intent or recklessness to be directed at specific 
computers, programmes, or data are the same as in section 1, discussed above. 
Section 3(5) states that doing an act includes “causing an act to be done”, and includes 
a series of acts. Furthermore, the impairing, preventing, or hindering can be temporary. 
On indictment conviction carries the penalty of up to 10 years, a fine or both; for 
summary procedure in England and Wales the maximum penalty is 12 months’ 
imprisonment, a fine not exceeding statutory maximum, or both (in Scotland the 
maximum imprisonment is 6 months).123 Example section 3 offences include sending 
viruses, embedding malware in email, and DDoS attacks.124 DDoS case law is an 
interesting area to consider in more depth.  
 
2.1.5 CMA 1990 section 3 and DDoS  
 
DPP v Lennon was a pre-Police and Justice Act 2006 reform case in which section 
3(1) still required an unauthorised “modification” to a system (whereas now it is 
unauthorised “act”125). In this case, Lennon used a mail bombing campaign126 against 
his former employers, sending 500,000 emails to the company servers.127 The court 
accepted that sending emails was a modification to the system; hence the question 
                                            
120 See also s. 17(8), “An act done in relation to a computer is unauthorised if the person doing the act 
(or causing it to be done)– (a) is not himself a person who has responsibility for the computer and is 
entitled to determine whether the act may be done; and (b) does not have consent to the act from any 
such person. In this subsection “act” includes a series of acts.” Amended by Police and Justice Act 
2006, Sch.14, para. 29. 
121 CMA 1990, s. 3(1)(a)-(c). 
122 Ibid., s. 3(2)(a)-(c). If the person is reckless as to whether the act will have these consequences, 
then that is an offence under s. 3(3). 
123 Ibid., s. 3(6). 
124 Zoest, supra n. 66, p. 2. 
125 CMA 1990, s. 3, amended by Police and Justice Act 2006, s. 36. 
126 Using the Avalanche v3.6 program. 
127 The emails were made to appear to come from a manager within the company. 
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was the authority of Lennon to do so, especially when sending emails is ordinarily an 
authorised activity. It was held that the implied consent of a user to receive emails is 
not without limits,128 and such consent does not stretch to cover situations where the 
purpose of emails is to overwhelm the system. As Keene LJ stated, the recipient “does 
not consent to receiving emails sent in a quantity and at a speed which are likely to 
overwhelm the server. Such consent is not to be implied from the fact that the server 
has an open as opposed to a restricted configuration.”129 As discussed above, the 
Police and Justice Act 2006 amended the CMA 1990130 to deal with unauthorised acts, 
where this act can be a series of acts, and any “impairment, prevention or hindering 
of something can be temporary”. As DDoS attacks do not ordinarily cause permanent 
damage to the server, merely knocking it offline temporarily, this brings them within 
the scope of section 3.   
 
In R v Caffrey,131 Caffrey was charged under section 3 for remotely modifying 
computer systems at the US Port of Houston, and impairing management of logistics 
at the port. He managed successfully to claim that he lacked the mens rea for the offence 
by alleging the act was carried out by a self-deleting Trojan horse. Despite no evidence 
of this Trojan ever being present on the machine, he was acquitted. Edwards has 
argued this result is “somewhat analogous to a murder case where the accused claims that he 
performed the act but only while possessed by aliens, or perhaps more likely, while sleepwalking” 
and due to the subject matter being computer science, unlike medicine, juries’ lack of 
expertise might cause them to err on the side of caution and to acquit.132 In another 
unusual basis for acquittal, one of the first CMA 1990 cases R v Bedworth133 saw the 
                                            
128 See CMA 1990, s. 17(8)(b) on definition of an ‘unauthorised act’. 
129 DPP v Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin) at 14; see also Jack J at 9: “the owner of a computer 
which is able to receive emails is ordinarily to be taken as consenting to the sending of emails to the 
computer. His consent is to be implied from his conduct in relation to the computer. Some analogy can 
be drawn with consent by a householder to members of the public to walk up the path to his door when 
they have a legitimate reason for doing so, and also with the use of a private letter box. But that implied 
consent given by a computer owner is not without limit. The point can be illustrated by the same 
analogies. The householder does not consent to a burglar coming up his path. Nor does he consent to 
having his letter box choked with rubbish.” 
130 See s. 3(5). 
131 Southwark Crown Court, Oct 17, 2003. 
132 Edwards, supra n. 41, p. 42. 
133 1993 (unreported), but see S. Gold, “UK Court Acquits Teenage Hacker” (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 17 Mar 1993), available at 
https://w2.eff.org/Net_culture/Hackers/uk_court_acquits_teenage_hacker.article (accessed 30 April 
2018), and some brief discussion in S. Fafinski, “Access Denied: Computer Misuse in an era of 
Technological Change” (2006) 70(5) Journal of Criminal Law 435.  
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hacker acquitted based on lack of mens rea due to expert witness testimony that he 
suffered from “computer tendency syndrome” and thus had an addiction to computers.  
 
2.1.6 CMA 1990 section 3ZA – unauthorised acts causing or creating risk of serious 
damage 
 
Section 3ZA was added by section 41 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and applies when 
the accused does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer, (i) knowing at that 
time it is unauthorised, (ii) causing, or creating a significant risk of serious damage of 
a material kind, and (iii) intends by doing the act to cause such damage or being 
reckless as to whether it is caused.134 Material damage could include damage to the 
environment or human welfare in any place or to the economy or national security of 
any country.135 Material damage to human welfare is a broad concept, including loss 
of human life, illness, or injury, disruption to supply of money, food, water, energy, or 
fuel, and disruption of communications systems, transport facilities, or health 
services.136 When causing material damage, it matters not if the act causes the 
damage directly, or is the only or main cause of the damage.137 Doing an act includes 
causing an act to be done, including if it is a series of acts. A country includes reference 
to a territory, and any place in, or part or region, of a country or territory.138 When 
convicted on indictment, the sanctions for this offence are up to 14 years, a fine, or 
both.139 When the act caused or created significant risk to human life, or human illness 
or injury, or serious damage to national security, the penalty can be life imprisonment, 
a fine, or both. We now conclude by looking at s3A CMA. 
 
2.1.7 CMA 1990 section 3A – making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in 
section 1, 3, and 3ZA offences 
 
Section 3A, as amended by section 41 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, seeks to control 
trade in tools used for computer misuse offences. An individual is guilty if they: 
 
                                            
134 CMA 1990, s. 3ZA(1). 
135 Ibid., s. 3ZA (2). 
136 Ibid., s. 3ZA(3). 
137 Ibid., s. 40(4). 
138 Ibid., s. 40(5). 
139 Ibid., s. 40(7). 
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 make, adapt, supply or offer to supply any article for use to commit, or assist 
commission of, a section 1, 3, or 3ZA offence 
 if they supply an article believing it is likely to be used in commission of these 
offences 
 if they obtain an article intending to, or with a view to, using it to commit (or to assist 
with commission of) these offences.140 
 
Interestingly, an article means any program or data held in “electronic form”.141 
Conviction on indictment carries up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both, and on 
summary procedure the standard 12 months’ imprisonment in England and Wales (6 
months for Scotland), a fine not exceeding statutory maximum, or both.142 
 
A risk is with dual-use articles, for example those that may have a lawful purpose in 
penetration testing or for managing security of computer systems, but also could be 
used for unlawful purposes. The Crown Prosecution Service143 clarifies that mere 
possession of articles is not an offence; intent is a key element to establish this 
offence. In determining the likelihood of the article being used for such purposes CPS 
guidance states that prosecutors should consider whether the article is developed 
mainly for committing such offences, if it is commercially available through legitimate 
distribution routes, what its user base is, and what its normal use cases are. As they 
argue, “prosecutors should look at the functionality of the article and at what, if any, 
thought the suspect gave to who would use it; whether for example the article was 
circulated to a closed and vetted list of IT security professionals or was posted openly”. 
The Low Orbit Ion Canon is an interesting example to consider. Following political 
fallout from WikiLeaks sharing confidential US diplomatic cables online, a number of 
high profile organisations cut hosting or donation payment services to the website.144 
Hacktivist collective145 Anonymous responded in support of WikiLeaks’ agenda with a 
                                            
140 Ibid., s. 3A(1-3). 
141 Ibid., s. 3A(4)  
142 Ibid., s .3A(5). 
143 Crown Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance on Computer Misuse Act 1990, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/computer_misuse_act_1990/ (accessed 30 April 2018). 
144 MasterCard, Visa, Amazon Web Services. 
145 Hacktivism ordinarily involves targets chosen through political or social motives with the emphasis 
on protest. 
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campaign of targeted DDoS attacks during ‘Operation Payback’.146 Interestingly, these 
DDoS attacks relied not on zombie botnets, but on individuals participating in the 
protest by volunteering their computers to be part of the network by downloading a 
piece of software called the Low Orbit Ion Canon.147 This software has legitimate 
purposes in stress testing networks, so if an individual downloads the software but 
does not then participate in the attack there is scope for arguing that they did not 
breach section 3A(3). 148   
 
2.2 European Law: The General Data Protection Regulation and the 
Network and Information Security Directive 2016 
 
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter ‘GDPR’) includes 
provisions on security of personal data.149 Here we focus on the new notification rules 
around personal data breach, i.e. “a breach of security leading to the accidental or 
unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, 
personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.”150 Any data controllers who 
suffer a personal data breach needs to notify the UK data protection regulator, the 
Information Commissioner Office, within 72 hours of discovery of the attack.151 They 
need to provide quite detailed information in a very short period of time, including: 
 
1. “the nature of the personal data breach including where possible, the categories 
and approximate number of data subjects concerned and the categories and 
approximate number of personal data records concerned.  
2. communicate the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other 
contact point where more information can be obtained;  
3. describe the likely consequences of the personal data breach;  
                                            
146 L. Edwards, “WikiLeaks, DDoS and UK Criminal Law: Key Issues” (Practical Law Company, 22 
December 2010), available at https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-504-3391 (accessed 30 
April 2018). 
147 The LOIC leaves IP addresses of participants, making them easily identifiable, and as Edwards 
notes, ibid., the police can easily use powers under s. 22 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 to obtain subscriber information from ISPs to cross reference with IP addresses of alleged 
attackers.  
148 See Edwards, supra n. 136, at section “Is merely downloading the LOIC tool a crime?”. 
149 GDPR, Art. 32. 
150 Ibid., Art. 4(12). 
151 Ibid., Art. 33. 
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4. describe the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to 
address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, measures to 
mitigate its possible adverse effect” (my emphasis)152 
 
In addition, they need to notify the data subject about the breach, in a clear and plain 
manner, without undue delay (but not within 72 hours) if it is likely to pose high risks 
to their rights and freedoms.153 This is unnecessary, however, if the following three 
conditions are met:  
 
1. “the controller has implemented appropriate technical and organisational 
protection measures, and those measures were applied to the personal data 
affected by the personal data breach, in particular those that render the 
personal data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access it, 
such as encryption;  
2. the controller has taken subsequent measures which ensure that the high risk 
to the rights and freedoms of data subjects referred to in paragraph 1 is no 
longer likely to materialise; 
3. it would involve disproportionate effort. In such a case, there shall instead be a 
public communication or similar measure whereby the data subjects are 
informed in an equally effective manner” (my emphasis)154 
 
Given the differentiated notification provisions here, end users are often likely to be 
finding out about data breaches through news stories or public messages from 
companies, particularly given the rise in the number of breaches (the number in 2016 
was 45% higher than in 2014).155 The knock-on effects from a breach are significant; 
compromised usernames and passwords can be used in further attacks, and a large 
market in compromised credentials has thus arisen). Websites like 
haveibeenpwned.com let users check if their credentials have been compromised, for 
example in the famous LinkedIn or Adobe hacks.156  However, smaller attacks are not 
                                            
152 Ibid., Art. 33(3). 
153 Ibid., Art. 34. 
154 Ibid., Art. 34(3). 
155 ENISA Report, supra n. 15. 
156 M. Burgess, “How to Check If Your LinkedIn Account Was Hacked” (Wired, 24 May 2016), available 
at https://www.wired.co.uk/article/linkedin-data-breach-find-out-included (accessed 30 April 2018). 
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publicised, or might not even be known about, and thus it is harder for users to know 
whether or not their data is at risk.  
 
There is a risk that by shifting the responsibility of engaging with security onto users, 
the emphasis is shifted away from organisations’ obligation to put in place good 
security practices, for example encryption by default. It is not enough to blame end-
users for bad passwords or poor security practices.157 Nevertheless, in practice, 
supporting users with education about risks, and creating more usable security tools 
is an important step. The field of usable privacy and security does much here, from 
making encryption tools easier to use to improving password and authentication 
technologies.158   
 
There is a vast number of internet users now across Europe. A Eurobarometer survey 
of 21,000 EU citizens shows device use for internet access: 92% use a desktop 
computer, laptop, or netbook; 61% use a smartphone; 30% use a touchscreen tablet; 
11% use a TV.159 In responding to security concerns, 61% are likely to install anti-virus 
software, while 49% would not open emails from people they do not know.160 85% 
think the risk of becoming a cybercrime victim is increasing, but just 47% feel well 
informed about these risks (10% very well informed; 10% fairly well informed).161 At 
the UK level, early initiatives like the Get Safe Online service have long sought to raise 
awareness of users and businesses on fraud, identity theft, and other online risks.162 
The National Crime Agency has continued this work, for example by creating guidance 
on how to download and update security software, or how to report cybercrimes to the 
Action Fraud service,163 as part of successive campaigns citizens on avoiding online 
scams, monitoring online privacy, and using strong passwords.164 Small and Medium 
                                            
157 A. Adams and M.A. Sasse, “Users Are Not the Enemy”, (1999) 42(12) Communications of the ACM 
40–46. 
158 See Cylab for example research: http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/#password (accessed 30 April 2018). 
159 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 423 – Cyber Security Summary, p. 7.  
160 Ibid., p. 11. 
161 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 
162 Website at https://www.getsafeonline.org/about-us (accessed 30 April 2018). 
163 Website at http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/report_fraud (accessed 30 April 2018). 
164 Cyber Streetwise campaign website at https://www.cyberstreetwise.com/partners (this website has 
since been superseded by the Government’s Cyber Aware campaign at https://www.cyberaware.gov.uk 
(accessed 30 April 2018). 
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Enterprise (SME) interests are also targeted with these programmes, largely due to 
their vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks.  
 
Beyond SMEs, larger organisations have an increasing role to play in addressing 
cybersecurity risks, especially those companies providing critical infrastructure. The 
2016 EU Network and Information Security Directive (hereinafter ‘NISD’),165 which 
must be transposed into domestic law by May 2018, provides guidance here.166 It 
establishes minimum harmonised standards for network and information security 
across the EU for critical infrastructure, requiring member states to adopt national 
measures and implementation strategies. It includes many provisions on cross-border 
cooperation, like creation of a network of computer security incident response teams 
(CERTS) and a strategic cooperation group to bring states together to share 
information about attacks.  
 
Under NISD, member states need to identify the operators of “essential services” in 
their territory from across the energy, transport, banking, financial markets, and health 
sectors.167 This includes bodies like energy operators involved in supply, distribution 
and storage of natural resources (for example oil pipelines, refineries, and rigs), 
transportation providers (for example air carriers, intelligent transport systems, or 
traffic management), banking (for example credit institutions), financial trading (for 
example stock markets), and healthcare providers (for example hospitals and clinics). 
Curiously, it also extends to three specific digital services, namely online 
marketplaces, online search engines, and  
cloud computing services.168 Online marketplaces are places where sales or services 
contracts are concluded with companies like eBay, or mobile application stores like 
Google Play or the Apple App Store. It does not include platforms that are 
intermediaries for third parties to conclude contracts later. An interesting question 
arises as to how “gig economy” services such as Uber or Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
would be treated in this respect. With regard to search engines, NISD relates to 
services that enable search for all content online as services like Google/Bing or 
                                            
165 Directive EU 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union. 
166 NISD, Art. 25. 
167 Ibid., Annex II. 
168 Ibid., Annex III 
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Yahoo provide, as opposed to price comparison sites or content search bars within an 
individual website.169 It does not cover internet service providers or trust providers,170 
as these are covered by separate legislation, for example the ePrivacy Directive 2002 
for ISPs.171  Despite procedural drivers towards establishing lists of essential services, 
and defining scope of the legislation, the more substantive provisions are around 
notification. 
 
2.3 International dimensions: cybercrime and cyberwarfare 
 
As cybercrime and warfare exists across jurisdictions, international legal frameworks 
are important to reflect on. In terms of policing cross border crime, the new EU ‘Police 
and Justice’ Data Protection Directive 2016172 provides a framework for law 
enforcement agencies to cooperate and share data across borders. However, we 
instead focus briefly on the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, as a 
longstanding instrument in this area. The Convention, which came into force in 
2011,173 seeks to create “a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society 
against cybercrime, inter alia by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering 
international co-operation”.174 It contains both substantive and procedural provisions, 
and seeks harmonisation by defining five offences signatories need to incorporate in 
their domestic law, including hacking, computer based fraud, and the distribution of 
illegal content.175 The UK covers many of these in the Computer Misuse Act 1990. In 
keeping the Convention up to date, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) has 
issued guidance notes176 on applying the Convention to topics including critical 
infrastructure attacks, DDoS attacks, botnets, new forms of malware and identity theft, 
                                            
169 Ibid., Recitals 14 and 15. 
170 Ibid., Recital 7. 
171 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications).  
172 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
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173 Council of Europe, Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 185, available at 
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174 See the Preamble of the Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest, 23 November 2001). 
175 Ibid., Ch. II, s. 1. 
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and phishing in relation to fraud.177 As of April 2018 the Convention has 57 overall 
ratifications, with the UK signing in 2001 and ratifying in 2011.178 It also contains more 
controversial procedural provisions for international cooperation which are intended to 
address the cross-border nature of cybercrimes and whereby states provide mutual 
assistance for investigations and evidence gathering.179   
 
Similarly, international laws need to be applied to understand how the frameworks 
accommodate the challenges of cyberwarfare.180 The law on the use of force and self-
defence in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter are being applied in new and difficult 
context of cyberwarfare, beyond the originally-intended scope of armed attacks 
causing kinetic damage. Overcoming challenges in attributing an attack to a nation 
state requires cooperation from technical and legal communities. Traffic can be 
masked and routed via several countries to hide the identity of perpetrators, making 
establishment of state responsibility for cyber-attacks difficult.181 Furthermore, given 
the messy crossover between cyber-war, -crime, -espionage, and -terrorism, to name 
a few, the holding of nation states responsible for acts of groups that may be acting 
autonomously, without knowledge or authority of the armed forces, poses further 
issues. Determining proportionate responses to interstate cyber-attacks raises political 
and ethical questions too, for example whether the use of kinetic attacks in response 
to cyber-attacks can be deemed legal,182 and whether it is or can be morally correct to 
do so. With states designing and building cyberweapons like Stuxnet, debates open 
up around appropriate controls over the cyber arms trade, through perhaps a treaty to 
control use of these weapons, or even to ban some, as with nuclear or chemical 
weapons.183 Nevertheless, despite all these difficult questions, in order to balance 
                                            
177 Guidance Notes numbers 2-7. 
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against the fear, uncertainty, and doubt surrounding cyberwarfare184 some experts 
recommend focusing on more mundane, but very real, threats to power grids: outages 




Throughout this chapter, we have explored the ever-shifting, adversarial nature of 
cybersecurity threats, actors, and the legal responses to them. As we increasingly 
augment our homes, cities, and bodies with sensors and computational devices, we 
need better strategies to secure attack vectors and patch vulnerabilities. The 
embedding of systems capable of physical actuation in our daily lives means the 
implications of exploits and hacks go beyond the desktop or smartphone screen, and 
begin to pose physical harms186. Guarding against these risks requires more than just 
recourse to ex ante legal measures. Instead, we need more holistic approaches to 
building security into devices and networks. This can only occur from closer alliance 
between legal, policy, and technical communities, working together in more agile ways 
to understand both the threats and what appropriate responses might be. Regulation 
in this domain, like many areas of technology law, is challenged by the pace of 
technological change. Nevertheless, to enable greater resilience to cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities we need to address risks of harm to users in a more prospective 
manner. This means finding ways to create technically secure, resilient systems that 
are supported by appropriate and effective cybersecurity regulation strategies.  
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